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MINERAL RIGHTS
Patrick H. Martin*
INTRODUCTION
Litigation on mineral rights topics continues to be dominated by
cases arising as a result of the depressed conditions of both the oil
and natural gas industries. The gas "bubble" has spawned years of
litigation over gas takes and pricing, while the bankruptcies of drilling
and service companies have led to continuing controversies over ap-
plication of lien laws.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
There was relatively little legislative activity in the 1987 regular
session that directly involved oil and gas law and regulation. Only a
couple of acts will be noted here.
Act No. 363'-Cyclic Injection Projects
Act number 363 adds subsection D to section 5 of title 30 of the
revised statutes. 2 This addition provides for approval by the Commis-
sioner of Conservation of cyclic injection projects. A cyclic injection
is defined in the act as "a single-well process in which a production
well is injected with a substance for the purpose of enhanced recovery.
After a shut-in period, the well is returned to production. This pro-
cedure may be performed repeatedly on one or more wells in a res-
ervoir."' Approval of a project may result when the Commissioner
makes a finding that the project will not drain any different area of
the reservoir than that being drained by the project well prior to
initiation of the project. Approval of a cyclic injection project will
not cause a change in the boundaries, tract participations or other
aspects of any unit previously formed under the provisions of title 30.
Act No. 895S-LEAP: Spudding Date and Set-Asides for Women-Owned
Businesses
The Louisiana Economic Acceleration Program (LEAP) which was
adopted in 1985 to provide an exemption from severance taxes for
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 1987 La. Acts No. 363.
2. 1987 La. Acts No. 363. To be codified at La. R.S. 30:5(D).
3. 1987 La. Acts No. 363.
4. 1987 La. Acts No. 895.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
certain wildcat and development wells has been amended to specify
that to qualify for the program the well has to have been spudded
after January 1, 1986. The Act was also amended to provide that to
qualify for its benefits the drilling operator must have "certified that,
to the maximum extent possible, at least ten percent of the operator's
service contracts related to the well have been made available to mi-
nority-owned businesses and that at least five percent have been made
available to women-owned businesses." 5
II. CONVEYANCE PROBLEMS; INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
Gas Purchase Contracts
In PGC Pipeline v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas6 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that credit for spot market sales was not to
be implied into a settlement agreement amending a gas purchase con-
tract, where there was a breach of a take-or-pay clause. Although a
take-or-pay contract is considered an alternative obligation under the
Louisiana Civil Code, breach of the alternative obligation contract does
not force the buyer to forfeit its choice as to future deliveries.
PGC (seller) and LIG (buyer) entered into gas purchase contracts
in 1980 and 1981, each containing a take-or-pay clause. In November
1983 they executed a settlement agreement which amended certain
provisions of the contracts. In 1985 the buyer ceased all takes of gas
from the seller and had paid no take-or-pay money since the November
1983 settlement agreement. The seller brought suit against the buyer
alledging breach. The defendant buyer asserted that the 1980 and 1981
agreements allowed credit for gas sold on the spot market and that
the same provision should be found to be implied in the 1983 settlement
agreement. The district court granted summary judgment for the seller,
awarded damages for past breaches, ordered specific performance for
the future, and held that the buyer had lost the "pay" option for the
remainder of the contract. The buyer appealed, and the court affirmed
in part and reversed in part.
The district court properly interpreted the contracts. The 1983
settlement agreement eliminated the credit provision by abandoning a
concept of "gas tendered to but not taken by Buyer" in favor of a
percentage of deliverability test, which in general was more favorable
to the buyer. A take-or-pay contract is considered an alternative ob-
ligation under article 1808 of the Louisiana Civil Code, but this does
not mean that breach of the alternative obligation contract forces the
5. To be codified at La. R.S. 30:148.2(1)(d); La. R.S. 47:648.1(1)(d).
6. 791 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1986).
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buyer to forfeit its choice as to future deliveries. A demand for
performance is a prerequisite for forfeiture of choice, and under the
clause, the buyer is granted a new choice each month. The seller has
no right to force the buyer to relinquish its option prior to the time
of choice. Thus, the district court was affirmed as to liability for past
breaches, but reversed in regard to future deliveries.
A gas purchase contract was also the subject of litigation in Pogo
Producing Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co.7 The trial court granted a
preliminary injunction in favor of the producer/seller of gas against
the pipeline company on six gas purchase contracts, requiring the
purchaser to take and pay for the annual minimum quantity of the
contract each year, and to take and pay for the minimum monthly
quantity of the contract each month. The purchaser appealed, asserting
that the contracts were not enforceable as the five year terms of the
contracts had expired.
The appellate court affirmed, ruling that the contracts contemplated
deliveries of gas after expiration of the contracts, entitling the seller
to specific performance in the event of the purchaser's breaches. The
"post-expiration" provision of the contract was made in contemplation
of regulatory requirements that the seller continue to sell to the pipeline
company unless abandonment were permitted. Mutuality of obligation
arose from this provision. The court further concluded that the take-
or-pay provisions constitute alternative obligations under Louisiana
law.8 After the expiration of the five year term, there was no longer
an option for the purchaser to take-or-pay, thus, the provision became
simply one of take-and-pay. Irreparable injury was threatened under
the circumstances, so the issuance of a preliminary injunction was
within the discretion of the trial court.
In yet another take-or-pay case, Paragon Resources, Inc. v. Na-
tional Fuel Gas Distribution Corp.,' the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial
court determination that an arrangement in which the seller waived a
take-or-pay provision was intended to be only temporary. Once the
period of waiver had passed, the take-or-pay obligation resumed.
Take-or-Pay: Rights of Lessor to Share as Royalty
Two Federal district courts in Louisiana have issued conflicting
decisions on the right of the lessor to receive a royalty on monies
paid to the lessee by a gas pipeline company under take-or-pay clauses
of gas purchase contracts. The issue is a very important one that has
significance beyond federal leases. Because of the gas "bubble" that
7. 493 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
8. See La. Civ. Code art. 1808.
9. 797 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1986).
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the United States gas market has experienced since 1982, there have
been numerous payments to gas producers and settlements of claims
under take-or-pay clauses of gas purchase contracts. Is the lessor en-
titled to a share of the money from such payments? The issue is likely
to produce as much litigation, and with rulings equally varied, as the
"market value" issue that has produced law suits for two decades.
In Mesa Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Department of the Interior,0 the
district court for the western district of Louisiana ruled that the lessee
of the United States was not obligated to pay royalty to the lessor on
monies paid to the lessee by the pipeline company under a take-or-
pay clause of a gas purchase contract. In this case, the plaintiff lessee
of federal government lands on the Outer Continental Shelf brought
a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had no
obligation to pay a royalty to the lessor on monies paid to the lessee
by a pipeline company under a gas purchase contract, after the Minerals
Management Service issued a demand letter for payment of overdue
royalties on such monies. Plaintiff asserted it owed royalty only on
production under the lease and relevant statutes. The court held for
the plaintiff; the order of the Interior Department demanding payment
of royalties was set aside.
Royalty, the court reasoned, is commonly understood as a right
to receive a share of production. The lease provides for royalty on
production. Payment of money under a take-or-pay clause of a gas
purchase contract is a payment in lieu of taking production. The
Interior Department regulation comprehends royalties accruing only as
natural gas is severed from the ground and sold. No royalty is owed
except on production.
In an unreported decision, a federal district court in the eastern
district of Louisiana held to the contrary under essentially the same
facts. In Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel," the court
ruled that royalties were owed on take-or-pay payments. The court
ruled that under the applicable statutes and regulations, take-or-pay
payments are part of the gross proceeds from the disposition of gas
on which the companies are required to pay a royalty. Royalty, ac-
cording to the court, is payable on all the normal components of the
value, regardless of the ability of the buyer and seller to separate, by
contract, into discrete payments, the various components of the value
of gas sold.
Recalculation of Price
In a pricing dispute between a seller and a buyer of natural gas,
the appellate court ruled in Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. Mid
10. 647 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. La. 1986).
11. Civ. A. No. 86-537 (E.D. La. 1987).
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Louisiana Gas Co.' 2 that the buyer had determined that the seller's
suggested "calculated price" was unacceptable. As a result, the buyer
then had the right under the contract to pay for the gas at the Natural
Gas Policy Act (NGPA) section 102 price and to recoup amounts paid
over this as payment of a thing not due. Because the contract was
applicable, there was no basis for recovery in quantum meruit by the
seller.
Plaintiff Union Texas was one of five working interest owners in
the Kizer well. In 1978 all five agreed to sell the well's gas to defendant
Mid Louisiana. Because of the Natural Gas Policy Act, they amended
their agreement in October, 1978 to provide for a price based on the
"calculated price" from an average of other wells in the same field.
If this price was unacceptable to the buyer, then it could advise the
seller that it was unacceptable and pay the NGPA section 102 rate,
with the seller having the right to give notice of termination.
On behalf of all working interest owners, the operator of the well
met with the defendant buyer to determine the "calculated price." The
buyer advised the operator that the price suggested was unacceptable
and then proposed a price based on a fifteen year contract. The buyer
began paying in accordance with this proposal at a price higher than
the NGPA section 102 price in anticipation of all sellers agreeing to
the proposal. Union Texas, alone, declined to sign the fifteen year
agreement because it had previously committed the gas to another party
after March 1981. Mid Louisiana then informed Union Texas of its
intent to recoup the amount above the section 102 price. Union Texas
continued to deliver, under protest, its share of the gas to Mid Lou-
isiana until March 1, 1981. Union Texas then filed suit for an ac-
counting and a determination of the proper price to be paid for the
gas delivered from December, 1979 to March, 1981. The matter was
submitted to a commissioner who issued a report favoring the plaintiff,
concluding that a "calculated price" had not been determined and that
the price to be paid was the price paid under other agreements in the
field.
The trial court adopted this reasoning and the defendant buyer
appealed contending that the contract price was the section 102 price
which it had paid. The appellate court reversed and rendered. Applying
the pricing clause, the buyer determined that the "calculated price"
was unacceptable and so advised the seller. The commissioner and trial
court erred in finding that there had never been a "calculated price"
to apply. Although the buyer paid a higher price than the section 102
price for a time in anticipation of all sellers agreeing to a long term
contract, it had the right to recoup this overpayment as payment of
12. 503 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 506 So. 2d 1228 (1987).
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a thing not due. Thus, the buyer fully, complied with the contract.
Because the contract was applicable and complied with, there was no
reason to apply a theory of quasi-contract to allow the seller to get
a higher price than the contract price.
Limitation of Warranty: Cover-All Clause of Lease
The cover-all clause in a lease granted in 1976 was held in Bergeron
v. Amoco Production Co. 3 to apply to two brothers' interest in land
inherited from their father in 1954, though the interest had not been
described in the lease because it was believed to belong to their mother.
The mother's lease on this interest had contained a warranty clause
which limited warranty to return of royalties. This provision was held
not to cover the brothers' interest once they inherited the mother's
rights under the lease.
Lester and Bennett Bergeron, the two brothers, and their mother,
Caroline Bergeron, had granted four leases covering six contiguous
tracts of land. These were later acquired by Amoco and Gulf. One
lease, granted by the mother alone, covered a forty acre tract. After
her death, which occurred soon after the lease was granted, the brothers
learned that she had only owned 513/2880ths and that they had actually
owned 2367/2880ths at the time the lease was granted. They had
inherited 2367/2880ths from their father in 1954 and later inherited
their mother's interest. They brought suit against Amoco and Gulf
contending the 2367/2880 interest was not subject to a lease. The
lessees' counterclaimed for a declaration that the brothers' interest was
covered by the warranty clause in the mother's lease, which they had
inherited from her, or by the cover-all clause in another lease, which
the brothers had granted as to their undivided interest in a contiguous
tract.
The district court held for the plaintiff brothers on their claim
that the warranty clause of the lease of their mother did not cover
their 2367/2880ths interest. The court, however, ruled for the lessees
on their counterclaim that the cover-all clause in another lease operated
to bind the brothers' 2367/2880ths interest.' 4
On appeal by the lessors, the district court judgment was affirmed.
The lease by the brothers on an undivided interest in a contiguous
tract contained a cover-all clause which operated to include under the
lease all land owned by the brothers in the sections of land covered
by the lease. It was the clear intent of the brothers to lease any and
all interest they had in any of the six tracts. Thus, the lease had to
be reformed to reflect the intent of the parties.
13. 789 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1986).
14. Bergeron v. Amoco Prod. Co., 602 F. Supp. 551 (M.D. La. 1984).
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Restriction on Operations on Land Personal to Lessor
The case of Ashby v. IMC Exploration Co." held that a correction
deed with a reservation of mineral rights deprived the purchaser of
land of any claim to the minerals. In addition, a lease clause prohibiting
operations within 300 feet of a dwelling was held not to be a stipulation
pour autri and, thus, a subsequent owner of land who did not acquire
mineral rights could not raise the issue of violation of the clause. The
court ruled further that negligence is not a necessary precedent for
recovery of damages under article 11 of the Mineral Code.
In 1958 J. E. Adcock granted a mineral lease now held by the
defendant. Plaintiff Ashby purchased the land from an heir of the
lessor in 1975, without reservation of mineral rights by seller. In 1979,
the seller and purchaser entered into a second conveyance regarding
the property in which the heir reserved all mineral rights. Ashby also
sold a portion of the property to plaintiff Faulk. In 1981 defendant
drilled a well on the property. Plaintiffs subsequently brought suit for
cancellation of the lease on the ground that the defendant violated a
lease clause prohibiting drilling operations within 300 feet of a rent
house on the property. Defendant asserted that the plaintiffs had no
rights to minerals, that they could not assert the lease clause restricting
operations, and that defendant was not liable for damages.
The trial court held for the defendant and the plaintiffs appealed,
wherein, the court of appeal affirmed. The 1979 deed was a correction
deed with a reservation of the minerals which deprived the plaintiffs
of any mineral interest in the property. The 300 foot restriction in the
lease was part of the contract between the lessor and lessee, and was
not a stipulation pour autri for the benefit of the landowner. The
lessee's use of the land was reasonable. In addition, negligence is not
a necessary precedent for recovery of damages under article 11 of the
Mineral Code' 6 which provides that both the owner of land burdened
by a mineral right and the owner of the mineral right must exercise
their respective rights with reasonable regard for those of the other.
The court's treatment of two issues in the instant case are worth
noting. The court holds that a lease restriction on operations within
a specified distance of a dwelling located on the property leased cannot
be asserted by a subsequent purchaser of the property who does not
acquire the mineral rights. The reason for this was that upon exam-
ination of the instrument, an intent was evidenced to create only a
personal obligation in favor of the lessor, not a limitation that inured
to the benefit of whomever was the owner of the property. The dissent
15. 496 So. 2d 1334 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 506 So. 2d 1193 (1987).
16. La. R.S. 31:11 (1975).
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noted that the result was troublesome. The lease is a real right and
burdens purchasers of the land, but under the court's approach the
purchaser of the land cannot assert any restrictions. But if the lease
is a real right, its extent is defined by the instrument creating it. The
purchaser of land takes the land subject to whatever is in the lease
and no more. The court by its approach enlarges the right burdening
the land. With whom will the purchaser of land negotiate when he
takes land subject to an outstanding lease? How is one to determine
from the public record what is and is not personal?
The second point of interest in the court's opinion is its treatment
of article 11 of the Mineral Code. It provides that both the owner of
land burdened by a mineral right and the owner of the mineral right
must exercise their respective rights with due regard to the rights of
the other.' The trial court had limited this to a standard of negligence
but the court here reads the article more broadly.I"
Parol Evidence
Although parol evidence may not be used to prove title to a mineral
royalty, an issue of fact existed in the pleadings in Clingan v. Doughty1 9
as to whether the term of a royalty had expired. Thus, the appeals
court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the claim to a royalty
for failure to state a cause of action.
Plaintiffs in 1972 sold to the defendants a tract of land less and
except 'the royalty interest which they presently own' in a specified
well in a specified producing unit. 20 In 1982 the lessee shut in the unit
well, and under the terms of the lease had sixty days in which to
begin good faith efforts to restore production. Plaintiffs alleged that
they verbally agreed with the lessee and the defendants that the lessee
would be given more than sixty days to commence operations. In
addition, as part of this agreement the defendants would give the lessee
a new lease and the plaintiffs would be reconveyed a one-eighth (4/
32ds) royalty for that which apparently would terminate under the
lease. Defendants did not convey a royalty under the new lease, and
the plaintiffs brought suit for declaration of their ownership of such
a royalty of 4/32ds. The defendants filed an exception of no cause
of action on the grounds that the plaintiffs were trying to establish
title to a mineral right through parol evidence. The trial court sustained
17. Id.
18. For a discussion of this subject see Morgan, Correlative Rights: Surface Owner
vs. Mineral Owner, 26th Institute on Mineral Law 141 (1980).
19. 491 So. 2d 469 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
20. Clingan, 491 So. 2d at 473.
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the exception and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed, wherein,
the appellate court reversed and remanded.
Under one possible interpretation of the conveyance in 1972, said
the court, the reservation was of a royalty that did not expire with
the lease. Thus, the plaintiffs might continue to have a royalty interest
and need not rely on an oral agreement to reconvey. The case was
remanded for resolution of the ambiguous 1972 conveyance.
Royalties in Louisiana, as in other states, may arise from a lease
or independently of a lease. A royalty created out of a lease terminates
when the lease terminates.21 In addition, a royalty which is created on
land owned by another or from a mineral servitude of another exists
independently of a lease and does not necessarily expire when the lease
terminates; however, such. royalty is subject to the rules of prescrip-
tion .22
In the principal case, the parties and the trial court apparently
regarded the royalty in question as a royalty created by a lease in
favor of a lessor which terminated when the lease in which it was
created terminated. The appellate court, however, evidently thought
that the royalty in question could be regarded as a royalty which
existed independent of any lease. This would not be incorrect if the
deed of December 7, 1972 which conveyed a fifty acre tract of land
and which reserved 'unto vendor, their heirs, successors and assigns,
the royalty interest which they presently own in and to' ' ' 3 oil and gas
from the specified well and specified division order was intended to
establish a new royalty. But if 'the royalty interest which they pres-
ently own' ' ' 24 was all that was reserved and if that royalty was de-
pendent on the lease, then the court's decision that the royalty survived
the lease is simply incorrect.
The court creates an ambiguity where none evidently exists; the
court observes that the reservation clause makes no mention of the
lease. The phrase "which they presently own" evidences no intent to
create a new royalty right, but only to except from warranty and
conveyance one already in existence. If all of this arose from a lease,
as appears implicit in the decision, then the court's analysis is clearly
wrong and there is no ambiguity to be resolved by resort to parol
evidence. The court appears to go out of its way to find an ambiguity
that does not seem to have entered into the case in the pleadings or
at the trial court level.
21. La. R.S. 31:126 (1975).
22. La. R.S. 31:80, 85 (1975).
23. Clingan, 491 So. 2d at 473.
24. Id.
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In Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp.,21 the trial court and court of
appeals refused to allow parol evidence to be used to bring about a
reformation of a farmout agreement where the party which alleged
error had signed the agreement after five weeks of review. The language
of the farmout, explained the court, clearly provided for the party
making the farmout to have a reserved interest for the entire area
subject to the lease agreement, and not just a portion of it as contended
by the party seeking a reformation. Summary judgment was appro-
priate, ruled the court, even assuming that there was an antecedent
agreement and that there was a material variance between it and the
written instrument. But the record could not support a reasonable
finding that a mutual mistake was made, such that the written in-
strument did not express the true intent of the parties at the time the
farmout was made.
Operating Agreement
The case of Lancaster v. Petroleum Corp. of Delaware26 grew out
of a well blowout. The well which the defendant operated blew out
on March 15, 1977 from causes other than negligence by the operator.
On March 21, 1977, the defendant operator notified the non-operators
that it was immediately resigning as operator and would plug and
abandon the well unless another took over as operator. The plaintiffs
claimed that the operator under the operating agreement had to provide
written notice ninety days in advance of resignation.
The court of appeal agreed that the resignation without ninety
days notice was a breach of the agreement. Plaintiff Lancaster sustained
a loss of interest in the well from the breach, as it had to give up a
portion of its "back-in" interest (right to share in production after
well costs have been recouped) to secure another operator on such
short notice. This interest in the well had a value27 even though the
well ultimately did not pay out. This value could be established by
expert testimony, and the court of appeal adopted the estimate given
by plaintiff's expert in the trial. Although the court found the defend-
ant's breach of contract to be in bad faith, there was no contractual
or statutory provision for attorney's fees; thus, the court could not
award such fees.
25. 812 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1987).
26. 491 So. 2d 768 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
27. The court relied on Fite v. Miller, 192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939), a case
involving breach of a duty to drill a well.
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Anti-Washout Clause of a Sublease: Binding Effect on Sublessee
Without Privity of Contract
In Robinson v. North American Royalties, Inc. ,28 the Pettijeans
had leased 579 acres to Robinson who thereupon subleased the entire
acreage to North American Royalties with reservation of one percent
of all production. The sublease contained an extension clause, or "anti-
washout" provision, which provided that the overriding interest would
also apply to any new mineral leases acquired by the sublessee or its
successors or assigns covering any of the 579 acres covered by the
original lease, if such leases were acquired within one year of the
expiration of the original lease. North American subleased to the Stone
Oil Corporation sixty percent of its interest in the Pettijean lease only
insofar as said lease covered land located within a certain production
unit established by the Commissioner of Conservation. North American
decided not to maintain the Pettijean lease outside the unit, and it
expired. Within one year of the expiration, Stone took a new lease
on a portion of the Pettijean acreage that was outside the unit. Ro-
binson made a claim against North American, Stone, and David Bintliff
stating that he was entitled to a one percent interest out of this new
lease under the terms of the "anti-washout" clause.
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants on the ground
that there was "no cause and/or right of action" for Robinson since
there was no privity of contract between him and Stone, relying on
Berman v. Brown. 29 Robinson appealed and the court of appeal af-
firmed in part, reversed in part, and rendered judgment.30 The Berman
case has been overruled legislatively by article 128 of the Louisiana
Mineral Code;3 ' thus, even without privity of contract, the sublessee is
responsible for performance to the sublessor. But this is only to the
extent of any interest acquired by the sublessee. The court ruled that
since Stone as sublessee only acquired rights in those parts of the
original Pettijean lease that were within the conservation unit, it was
not bound by the anti-washout provision as to acreage outside that
unit. On appeal from this decision to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
the case was remanded for amendment of the plaintiff's petition and
introduction of the farmout agreement.1 2
On the remand the trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendant Stone. This .was affirmed by the court of appeal for the
28. 463 So. 2d 1384 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
29. 224 La. 619, 70 So. 2d 433 (1953).
30. Robinson v. North Am. Royalties, Inc., 463 So. 2d 1384 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1985).
31. La. R.S. 31:128 (1951).
32. Robinson v. North Am. Royalties, Inc., 470 So. 2d 112 (La. 1985).
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third circuit in Robinson v. North American Royalties, Inc.33 Stone
was held not to be a successor or assign of North American by virtue
of its farmout agreement. Since the suspensive condition of drilling a
well on the acreage outside the unit was never fulfilled, Stone did not
become a successor or assign of North American. Where there is no
privity of contract between the owner of an overriding royalty and
the holder of the working interest, the anti-washout provision of an
agreement creating the royalty cannot apply.
Bankruptcy-Compromise
A compromise agreement by a bankruptcy trustee was set aside
by the district court after objections from members of the creditors'
committee, and this action was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in In re Emerald Oil Co. v. Bennett.14 Emerald purchased
a one-quarter working interest in a lease for $50,000 in April, 1979.
At about the same time, Emerald purported to assign one-half of this
interest to the wife of one of the principals of Emerald for $100 and
other valuable consideration. This assignment was recorded in February,
1980 after there were strong indications that a well presently being
drilled would produce gas in significant quantities. The following month
the well was completed and an expert estimated at that time that the
wife's interest after tax was worth more than three million dollars.
Five days after this estimate was furnished, Mrs. Bennett paid Emerald
$175,000 for her share of the drilling costs of the well. A month later,
on May 16, 1980, Emerald filed for protection under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code.
The trustee in bankruptcy sought to recover the interest of Mrs.
Bennett as a fraudulent conveyance and filed three adversary pro-
ceedings related to this. The trustee subsequently sought to compromise
the three adversary proceedings, allowing Mrs. Bennett's estate to
continue to own a portion of the interest. The bankruptcy judge
approved the compromise. On appeal to the district court, the court
reversed the approval and remanded. After the bankruptcy judge again
approved the compromise, the district court again reversed, holding
that the bankruptcy court had abused its discretion in approving the
compromise.
The Fifth Circuit upheld this ruling stating that the trustee not
only had a strong case for avoiding a transfer but probably could do
so as a matter of law. While the transfer was initiated in April, 1979,
Mrs. Bennett's title was perfected only through the recordation of the
33. 509 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
34. 807 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1987).
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assignment which occurred less than ninety days prior to the bankruptcy
filing. Louisiana law would not recognize an equitable interest in the
property under these circumstances. The interest was acquired for an
unreasonably low sum and the transfer was made at a time when the
debtor was insolvent.
Mineral Royalties: Separate Property Upon Death
In Succession of Doty," the court was called upon to determine
the character of royalty payments under a mineral interest of the
decedent that had been separate property upon entering into a second
marriage. At his death, his mineral interest was under lease and there
was production. In the succession the widow asserted that the royalties
under the lease continued to be community property after death. Two
children from the first marriage contended that the mineral interest
was separate property and thus all royalties arising after the decedent's
death had to be treated as separate property. The court ruled that
although the royalties were community property during the marriage,
the nature of the property interest continued to be separate and upon
decedent's death the royalties were no longer to be treated as fruits
enjoyed by the community. Failure of the husband to file a reservation
of fruits during the existence of the community had no bearing upon
the subject after his death.
III. STATE LANDS AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Effect of Prior Supreme Court Characterization of Water Body as
Navigable
Where the Louisiana Supreme Court has characterized Grand Lake
as a lake for determination of rights of other landowners in prior
litigation and where no material issue of fact in the present proceeding
as to whether the same body of water was involved, it was appropriate
for the trial court to grant summary judgment for the state. This was
the ruling of the court of appeal for the first circuit in McCormick
Oil & Gas Corp. v. The Dow Chemical Co.3 6
In this case an oil company had leases from two different lessors
or lessor groups, the state and private landowners. The company filed
a concursus proceeding to determine which lessors had the right to
royalties attributable to land (accretion, alluvion or dereliction) which
was between the low water mark and the high water mark of a certain
35. 496 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
36. 489 So. 2d 1047 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
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water body known as Grand Lake. If the water body were a lake, the
state owned the former lake bed up to the high water mark; if a
stream, the riparian landowners had the right to the land through the
rules of accretion.
After the suit was filed, the Louisiana Supreme Court in a different
case with other private landowners ruled that Grand Lake-Six Mile
Lake was a navigable lake in 1812 and thus the state of Louisiana
owned the rights to land and minerals up to the high water mark.1
7
The state then moved for summary judgment in this proceeding based
on the ruling in State v. Placid Oil Co. that the water body in question
was a lake. The trial court granted the summary judgement and the
private lessors appealed, wherein, the appellate court affirmed. The
prior ruling of the Louisiana Supreme Court rendered invalid the
private lessors' claim that the water body was a stream. No issues of
fact remained and thus summary judgment *was appropriate.
The court in the principal case gives what amounts to a res judicata
effect to a determination by the Louisiana Supreme Court that a
particular water body was a lake and not a stream even though the
same parties were not involved. This avoids the possibility of the
anomaly of a particular water body changing from a lake to a stream
and then back to a lake from case to case.
Effect of Compromise by State
Compromise agreements between the state and a group of private
claimants to land, both having leased a disputed area to the same
lessee, has no legal effect on the lessee who was not a party to the
agreements and such lessee has a claim for breach of warranty against
the state and private lessors as decided in Chevron U. S. A., Inc. v.
Lorio.38 In the same case the court held that an act of the legislature
which fixed the boundary of the bottom of a water body was not
unconstitutional as an alienation of mineral rights because property
was acquired by the act, and the act was not a special or local law
requiring publication of notice of the intention to introduce such a
bill.
Lessee Chevron had taken a lease from the Lorios for a one-eighth
royalty on a tract of land and had taken another lease from the state
of Louisiana for a one-sixth royalty in the same area around False
River. After production had commenced, Chevron invoked a concursus
proceeding to determine to which party it actually owed royalties and
reserved its rights to seek a refund of money deposited in the court
37. State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 154 (La. 1974).
38. 496 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 498 So. 2d 754 (1986).
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(at the higher royalty rate payable under the state lease) if it were
determined that the Lorios were the proper claimants. The state and
the Lorios compromised their differences and moved for summary
judgment to dismiss the proceedings. Chevron opposed this motion
seeking instead a determination of rights and a refund. After the trial
court granted summary judgment to dismiss the proceedings, Chevron
appealed. The first circuit reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings, holding that a party can invoke a concursus proceeding and
deny liability to a claimant.3 9 On remand the trial court held that the
compromise agreements, under which the Lorios and the state agreed
that the state lease would control and that the full amount on deposit
would be divided among themselves, were not binding on Chevron and
that Act 285 of 197540 was not unconstitutional. The state appealed
and the court of appeal affirmed.
The compromise agreements between the state and the Lorios did
not determine ownership and thus could not be binding on the lessee
Chevron which was not a party to the compromises. Because the state
only owns the bed of False River to the ordinary low water mark,
the Act, which fixed the state boundary at a point above this, did
not alienate a water bottom in violation of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974. Because the Act affected the ownership of state property
which is a concern to all citizens of the state, the Act is not a special
or local law for which there must be publication of notice of intent
to introduce such a bill.
Alienability of Mineral Rights Through Compromise Agreement
In American Lung Association of Louisiana, Inc. v. State Mineral
Board,4' the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the Louisiana con-
stitutional proscription of alienation of mineral rights from state lands
was not violated by a compromise of a lawsuit involving land donated
by a private party to the state with a restriction on the use of the
land in the donation.
In 1924 the predecessor of plaintiff American Lung Association
of Louisiana, Inc. donated two tracts of land to the state without
reserving mineral rights. The land was to be used as a sanatorium for
tuberculosis victims. After the number of tuberculosis patients de-
creased, the state began to use the land and facilities for other purposes.
In 1975 plaintiff filed suit against the state through the Louisiana
Health and Human Resources Administration to revoke the donation
39. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Lorio, 442 So. 2d 1157 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983),
writs denied, 444 So. 2d 1244 (1984).
40. 1975 La. Acts No. 285.
41. 507 So. 2d 184 (La. 1987).
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on the ground that the land was no longer being used for the purpose
for which it was donated. The parties settled the suit in 1977 with a
portion of the land being returned to the plaintiff. In 1979 the plaintiff
granted a mineral lease on the tract in question. In 1983, the State
Mineral Board took steps toward leasing the same property. Thereupon,
plaintiff filed a petition to quiet title to the tract and to enjoin the
state from leasing the property. The courts below dismissed the plain-
tiff's claim on the grounds that the state was prohibited from selling
or exchanging any minerals rights under the Louisiana Constitution
42
and that plaintiff had not obtained legislative authorization to sue the
Mineral Board. 43
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. The purposes for the pro-
hibition on selling mineral rights is to prevent the plundering of valuable
state assets by the few and to preserve valuable state assets for future
generations. These purposes were not present here. A compromise, said
the court, is something entirely different from a sale or an exchange,
and does not contravene the constitutional provision. As to the leg-
islative authorization, the court gave retroactive effect to a legislative
resolution passed after the institution of the suit.
The result of the decision in American Lung Association does not
seem objectionable. If anything, the decision could increase rather than
decrease the mineral holdings of the state. That is, should the case
have gone the other way, then potential donors of land and minerals
to the state would be on notice that despite a violation of their
restrictions on the use of land donated to the state, the state would
retain at least a part of the donation. A donor recognizing this would
be less likely to donate land with minerals. Thus, the decision makes
donations more likely, and this is likely to benefit the state.
Concursus Proceeding Involving the State-Default
Shell Oil provoked a concursus proceeding joining as defendants
the Minvielle family and the state of Louisiana in 1968, and filed
amending petitions in 1969 and 1970. The state failed to file an answer.
In 1984 the trial judge ordered all defendants to file answers within
ten days of publication of his order. Again, the state failed to file an
answer and the court entered judgment in favor of the Minvielles.
Nearly a year later the state filed a motion to annul the judgment
because of the failure of the Minvielles to confirm a judgment by
default in a suit against the state. 44 The trial court and court of appeal
42. La. Const. art. IX § 4(A).
43. See American Lung Ass'n, Inc. v. State Mineral Bd., 490 So. 2d 343 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1986), rev'd, 507 So. 2d 184 (1987).
44. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1704 (1970).
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held in Shell Oil Co. v. Minvielle45 that the requirement of confirmation
of default judgments against the state provided in article 1704 of the
Code of Civil Procedure is inapplicable in a concursus proceeding.
Limitation of Actions: Personal Actions
The Plaquemines Parish Commission Council (Council) brought an
action to recover overriding mineral interests affecting its lands. These
interests were acquired by defendant Delta Development, Inc. (Delta)
and the heirs and successors of Leander H. Perez, Sr. (Perez) and his
wife Agnes 0. Perez. The Council alleged that Perez acquired overriding
interests in leases granted in 1936 and 1938 by predecessors of the
Council to Delta which was a corporation owned and controlled by
Perez. Since Perez was a member of the Council and also an attorney
and public official of the parish (district attorney and ex-officio legal
counsel for the Council's predecessors), the Council asserted that Perez's
actions and concealment of his relationship with Delta constituted
fraud, conflict of interest, and violation of a fiduciary duty. The
defendants then filed a peremptory exception of prescription. The
trial court ruled for all defendants, holding that the suit was a personal
action subject to ten years prescription. On the plaintiff's appeal, the
fourth circuit affirmed. An action to recover overriding mineral rights
and for an accounting because of fraud and violation of fiduciary duty
is a personal action which prescribes in ten years, held the fourth
circuit in Plaquemines Parish Commission Council v. Delta Develop-
ment Co., Inc.46 The ten years commenced to run in 1941 when the
Council's predecessors investigated the circumstances surrounding the
leases. Although a levee district is the "state" for the purpose of
determining whether acquisitive prescription of mineral rights can run, 47
the levee district is not the "state" for the purpose of constitutional
immunity from liberative prescription which is applicable to personal
actions. There is no constructive trust established under Louisiana law
for the Council arising from a breach of fiduciary obligations. The
Commission Council appealed.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. 4a Under the doctrine of
contra non valentem prescription was suspended. The court found that
the Council and its predecessor were "effectually prevented" from
availing themselves of their cause of action by the affirmative acts of
concealment, misrepresentation, legal challenges and fraudulent conduct
45. 491 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
46. 486 So. 2d 129 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 502 So. 2d 1034 (1987).
47. Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 362 So. 2d 734 (La. 1978).
48. Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., Inc., 502 So. 2d 1034
(La. 1987).
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on the part of Leander Perez, Sr., and by the further affirmative
concealment on the part of his public official sons who succeeded him.
Thus, the exception of prescription was erroneously sustained by the
lower courts.
Possessory Action
The right to maintain a possessory action was at issue in Graham
v. McRae Exploration, Inc."9 Plaintiffs (Graham heirs and their lessees)
brought a possessory action against defendants (Gladney heirs and their
lessees) alleging that Graham had purchased ten acres of property from
Gladney in 1942. Gladney granted a mineral lease to the disputed proper-
ty in 1974. In 1976 the property was included in a compulsory unit formed
by the Commissioner of Conservation and production was obtained from
the unit, though the unit well was not on the disputed property. The plain-
tiffs brought the possessory action in 1980, more than one year after the
leasing, drilling, and production occurred. Plaintiffs sought to be recog-
nized as possessors and to receive a full accounting for the minerals taken
from the property. Defendant lessees of the Gladneys answered and filed
a reconventional demand asking the court to recognize the validity of their
leases and filed a third party claim against the Gladneys for return of
the bonus and royalties if the plaintiffs should be successful. They also
filed an exception of no cause of action and/or liberative prescription,
claiming that the plaintiffs failed to file their possessory action within
one year of the alleged disturbance of possession. After the trial court
granted summary judgment on this exception, the Gladneys also filed an
exception of no cause of action claiming that the plaintiffs were not en-
titled to assert a possessory action because of failure to file within one
year of the alleged disturbance of possession. The trial court also sus-
tained this exception and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with prejudice. Plain-
tiffs appealed and the second circuit reversed and remanded.
Production from the unit was a disturbance in fact of the plaintiffs'
mineral rights and the trial court correctly found that because the
plaintiffs had failed to bring a possessory action as to the mineral
rights within one year of the disturbance, they are barred from doing
so.50 But the disturbance as to the mineral rights did not disturb the
49. 493 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
50. La. R.S. 31:156 (1975). The court properly recognized that the execution of a
lease constituted a disturbance in law but did not interrupt corporeal possession. La.
Code Civ. P. art. 3659. Montgomery v. Breaux, 338 So. 2d 314 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976), writ denied, 341 So. 2d 410 (1977); Thevenet v. Clause, 302 So. 2d 649 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1974).
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right of possession of the surface, and the plaintiffs had not lost the
right to bring a possessory action of the surface of the property.
IV. LEASE MAINTENANCE
Implied Covenant of Development
An oil and gas lease was cancelled by the federal district court as
to acreage outside a unit for failure to develop as a reasonable prudent
operator in Goodrich v. Exxon Corp.5 A judicial determination clause
of the lease was held not to apply; application of the clause would
be a vain and useless thing, said the court, where the lessee had made
an express decision not to develop the lands outside the unit.
Lessors of 1245 acres of land brought suit against the lessee for
cancellation of the lease for failure to develop the acreage as a rea-
sonably prudent operator. A fieldwide unit had been established in
1958 in which there had been very extensive development and pro-
duction until the filing of the suit. The court held the lease was
cancelled as to acreage outside the geographic boundaries of the unit.
Without a Pugh clause, a lease is held in its entirety by unit production.
However, the lessee must continue to develop the land as a reasonable
prudent operator. Here the facts established that there had been rea-
sonable development of the unit acreage, but that the lessee had not
developed and had no plans for development of the acreage outside
of the unit.
In this situation, a "judicial determination" clause requiring a
prior judicial determination followed by an opportunity to develop for
some specified period was not given effect as it would have been a
vain and useless thing. Further, the lessors' demand for cancellation
of the lease as to all minerals within the limits of the unit lying below
the deepest producing horizon was denied. However, the lessors' de-
mand for cancellation as to all remaining lands under the lease was
granted. A successful plaintiff in a suit for dissolution of a mineral
lease for failure to comply with its obligations is entitled to attorney's
fees even if the dispute is in good faith.
The legal standard which the court is applying in the instant case
is not entirely clear. Normally the lessor has the burden of proving
that the lessee has not developed the leased premises as a reasonably
prudent operator. This often is accomplished by the lessor showing
the likelihood or prospect of production in paying quantities or that
51. 642 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. La. 1986).
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another operator is willing to drill on the undeveloped acreage. 2 Ap-
parently, the court here shifted the burden to the lessee to show why
it had not developed acreage outside the unit once it was shown there
had been no outside development. The court was satisfied that once
it became clear that the lessee had no plans for development of the
acreage outside the unit, the lease should be cancelled as to that acreage.
If this is the court's standard, then it would seem that the court should
have cancelled the lease below the deepest producing horizon of the
unit, as well as the acreage outside the geographic confines of the
unit, if the lessee had no plans to drill to a greater depth.
A second case involving the implied obligation to develop as a
reasonable, prudent operator was Morrison v. D & L Partnership.3
The lessor had sought in this case to obtain a reformation of the lease
of six residential lots. The lease he granted had replaced earlier leases
that had contained six month primary terms; the printed primary term
had been crossed out and six months had been written in on those
leases. In the new lease, the ten year primary term had not been
crossed out. The lessor testified that he thought the lease was for six
months, but the court did not allow reformation because of the public
records doctrine and the rights of a third party had intervened.14
However, the lessor had also sought relief under the implied obligation
of the lessee to develop as a reasonable, prudent operator. The court
observed that there was no initial consideration for the lease and that
there was no obligation to drill or to pay a delay rental from year to
year under the lease. Under the circumstances, the court said that it
would be contrary to public policy to allow the lessee to escape the
requirement of development for ten years. It would take the property
out of commerce and thwart the purpose of mineral leasing. After
reviewing the activities and intentions of the operators, the court con-
cluded the lease to be cancelled even though it was still in its primary
term.
Implied Development-Necessity of Putting in Default
At issue in Taussig v. Goldking Properties Co.55 was the necessity
of the lessor putting the lessee in default of its implied lease drilling
obligations prior to maintaining suit. The trial court found that the
lessees had abandoned the leases because of their failure to undertake
52. See Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Romero, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952);
Nunley v. Shell Oil Co., 76 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954); Vetter v. Morrow,
361 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
53. 499 So. 2d 988 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
54. La. R.S. 9:2721 (1965); McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
55. 495 So. 2d 1008 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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additional development. The court treated this as an active breach
which obviated the need to put the lessee in default. The court of
appeal held that the trial court erred in its holding. The attorneys for
the lessors made demands for lease cancellation, not for development.
Thus, the demands were not a putting in default. A demand for
cancellation is not a substitute for placing in default.5 6 The Mineral
Code has no provision defining abandonment of a lease; thus, the
court felt it necessary to look to the Civil Code for treatment of the
subject.5 7 The trial court's conclusion that a passive breach had been
transformed into an active breach obviating the necessity of placing
in default under Civil Code standards was erroneous. The court of
appeal stated: "Since the duty to develop is an implied obligation, the
jurisprudence has consistently held that a breach of this duty is passive,
and a formal placing in default is required before judicial intervention
may be sought." ' 58 Physical plugging and abandonment of the five wells
did not constitute proof of abandonment of the Mallett Bay lease.
Internal communications of the companies was inconclusive as to lease
non-development.
Continuous Drilling Clause: Depth Limitation Clause
An oil and gas lease containing both a continuous operations clause
(allowing lease maintenance beyond end of primary term by operations)
and a depth limitation clause (limiting what depth could be held by
production after end of primary term) was held in Massie v. Inexco
Oil Co. 5 9 to be maintained beyond the primary term by operations,
such that the depth limitation clause applied only when acreage was
held beyond the primary term solely by production.
Suit for cancellation of a mineral lease was brought by the lessor
as to his interest. The defendant claimed that the lease was held as
to all depths under the continuous drilling clause of the lease. The
lessor asserted that the continuous drilling clause was limited by a
clause which operated as an absolute cut-off at the end of the primary
term requiring the lessee to release all depths 100 feet below the deepest
productive depth when the lease was being maintained only by pro-
duction. The district court granted judgment for the plaintiff lessor,
interpreting the clause as an absolute cut-off at the end of the primary
term and declaring that no additional rights existed under the contin-
uous drilling clause to explore deeper depths when the lease was being
56. Id. at 1015, citing Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate, 195 La. 865, 197 So. 583
(1940).
57. La. Civ. Code arts. 1931-1933.
58. Taussig, 495 So. 2d at 1014.
59. 798 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1986).
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held by production at the end of the primary term. 60 The defendant
lessee appealed and the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The depth
limitation clause here relates to holding the lease beyond the primary
term by production, not to other means by which the lessee may hold
the lease beyond the primary term, such as by continuous operations
as was the case here. The language of the depth limitation clause was
not the clear, unmistakable language necessary to negate the right to
hold the lease by continuous operations.
Lease Cancellation and Double Damages for Bad Faith Nonpayment
of Correct Royalty
Leases were cancelled and damages for actual damages plus double
actual damages properly were awarded where evidence established inten-
tional improper and incorrect payment of royalties to lessors in the case
of Wegman v. Central Transmission, Inc.6 1 There was also liability under
a gas purchase contract for failure to calculate properly the price and
quantity of gas.
Plaintiffs, the lessors and grantor in a gas sales contract, brought
suit against defendant Central Transmission, Inc. (CTI) and a related
limited partnerships controlled by CTI seeking to recover royalties on
leases and to collect amounts due under a gas purchase contract.
Involved were three tracts of land. Two and one-half of these lands
were under lease to CTI and the other one-half was under a gas
purchase contract with CTI. An agreement supplemental to the leases
and the gas purchase contract was entered into by CTI and the plaintiff
Wegman. The agreement provided for the amount of royalty to be
paid, being dependent on the pricing of the gas if a sale might be
obtained from the city of Monroe. CTI assigned the leases to its related
limited partnerships and then CTI purchased the gas from its limited
partnerships. CTI then sold the gas to IMC Pipeline (IMC) with CTI
transporting the gas through a gathering system purchased from Weg-
man which CTI extended one-third of a mile.
After learning of irregularities in accounting and payment of roy-
alties, plaintiffs brought suit. The jury concluded that the plaintiffs
were not being paid for the quantity of gas actually produced by their
wells and that the defendant had exceeded the contractually permissible
deduction for line loss. Further, the jury found that the defendants
consciously misled the plaintiffs about the identity of the purchaser
of the gas and that this had a direct bearing on the price. They also
found that the defendant CTI incorrectly stated the price on which
60. Massie v. Inexco Oil Co., 614 F. Supp. 880, (W.D. La. 1985).
61. 499 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986), writ denied, 503 So. 2d 478 (1987).
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royalties should have been based and incorrectly set forth the amount
of production from the wells. Finally, they found that royalties due
plaintiffs should be based on the price for which CTI sold gas to
IMC.
The trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs, awarding double
the royalties due (though entering judgment NOV on a different method
of calculation than the jury's), interest and attorneys fees, and can-
celling the leases. The defendants appealed, asserting that the claims
had prescribed under the one year prescriptive period for torts, that
an agreement was incorrectly applied and interpreted, and that a wrong
determination as to market value was made.
On appeal, the second circuit amended and affirmed as amended.
The plaintiffs' claim sounded in contract and thus had not prescribed.
Even if it were in tort, the prescriptive period was interrupted by
payments made by defendant in response to a demand letter; partial
payment is acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt prescription. The
interpretation and application of the agreement in question was rea-
sonable according to the court. The evidence clearly showed that the
contracts between CTI and its limited partnerships did not establish
fair market value. The use of CTI's gathering system did not constitute
a true transportation cost and, thus, the jury was correct in denying
defendant a credit. Market value is a question of fact, and there was
ample evidence to support the jury determination of market value.
There was also adequate evidentiary foundation for the jury's deter-
mination as to the measurement of the quantity of gas produced.
The trial judge did not err in entering judgment allowing calculated
damages by taking the amount established as actual damages, doubling
this amount, and then adding it to the amount of actual damages
resulting in an award that was three times the amount of actual
damages. The jury apparently wished to award the maximum amount
of monetary damages, but had not properly calculated such damages.
The award of attorney's fees was incorrect to the extent that it awarded
attorney's fees related to the gas purchase contract portion of the
litigation; attorneys fees are available only for failure to pay royalties
due under a lease. Although dissolution of a lease is not favored, it
should be granted when the conduct of the lessee is such that the
damages remedy is inadequate to do justice. Here there was adequate
support for the jury's finding that the remedy of damages was in-
adequate to do justice. The judgment was amended to correct the
amount of attorney's fees and to provide legal interest on the attorney's
fee award from the date of judgment until it was paid.
Based on the facts found by the jury, there seems to be little
reason for questioning the court's conclusion that while the Louisiana
Mineral Code disfavors dissolution of leases for improper payment of
a royalty, lease cancellation was an appropriate remedy in the principal
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case. One might note the treatment of the issue of doubling of damages
under article 140 of the Mineral Code which provides: "If the lessee
fails to pay royalties due . . . the court may award as damages double
the amount of royalties due .... ,,62 The jury apparently thought this
meant if $1.00 was owed then the damages awarded could be $2.00.
The trial court, however, read it as providing that if $1.00 was owed
then the damages that could be awarded would be $1.00 actual damages
plus $2.00 more as damages for a total of $3.00. Apparently the parties
did not disagree with the trial court's reading of the manner of cal-
culating the doubling of damages, and the court of appeal affirmed
the approach.
Royalty: Deduction of Marketing Expenses
Unless the parties agree otherwise, the cost of marketing the gas
once it has been produced is shared by the lessor and lessee under a
market-value lease. This was the ruling in Merritt v. Southwestern
Electric Power Co. 63 where the court held that the compression costs
in the case were post-production costs and were properly deductible
under the lease.
Lessors brought suit for cancellation of a lease and for damages
after the lessee began deducting compression charges from the royalty
payments. The trial court ruled in favor of the lessors holding that
no charges could be made against their royalty for compression and
ordering a refund of prior charges, but rejecting cancellation of the
lease and other damages. The defendant appealed and the court of
appeal reversed. Under the lease, royalty was to be paid on the market
value at the well. There was no market at the mouth of the well here
because of the low pressure of the gas. Compression was necessary to
make the gas marketable; it was an element of the marketing function.
Louisiana follows an approach of reconstructing market value for a
royalty by beginning with the gross proceeds and deducting therefrom
any additional costs of taking gas from the wellhead to the point of
sale. As stated earlier, unless the parties agree otherwise, the cost of
marketing the gas once it has been produced is shared by the lessor
and lessee under a market-value lease. Here, the compression costs
were post-production costs and were properly deductible under the
lease.
Effect of Unit Established by Commissioner of Conservation on
Acreage Outside of Unit When Unit Well is Off the Leased Tract
. A pooling clause in a lease that provided for division of the lease
upon exercise of the pooling power (if unit well was not on leased
62. La. R.S. 31:140 (1975).
63. 499 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
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tract) was held not to apply to pooling resulting from an order of the
Commissioner of Conservation in Mathews v. Goodrich Oil Co.64 In
Pearson v. Larry,6 5 the same lease provision was at issue with essentially
the same facts. The trial court erroneously concluded that the leased
acreage had been "divided" under a lease clause by the creation of
a compulsory unit. As in Mathews, the lease clause in Pearson was
to apply only to voluntary units. Thus, the trial court was reversed.
Although the lessee executed a release of the outside acreage after the
action was instituted, this fact could not make the lessees liable for
damages and attorney's fees for failing to release the acreage within
thirty days of demand for release, 66 as provided under the Mineral
Code.6 7
Cessation of Drilling Clause-Retained Acreage
A question of leased acreage retention was raised in Miami Corp.
v. Exxon Co., USA. 68 The lease was granted in 1980 and covered more
than 2,000 acres. It contained a clause obligating the lessee, after
discovery of oil gas or other minerals, to "conduct drilling or reworking
operations upon the leased premises, with not more than one hundred
twenty (120) days elapsing between cessation of actual drilling or re-
working of one well and the beginning or actual drilling or reworking
of another." ' 69 Failure to drill or rework continuously under this pro-
vision was intended to result in an automatic termination of the lease,
except for the portion saved by an acreage retention clause incorpo-
rating a size related to the unit size. The court held that all acreage
not in a unit terminated under this provision after 120 days had elapsed
from the last cessation of drilling. The court rejected a claim that a
provision containing a sixty day notice requirement along with an
opportunity by the lessee to comply with the lease obligations allowed
the lessee to retain additional acreage under the facts. The sixty day
provision, explained the court, "simply means that Miami [the lessor]
could not file suit to require delivery of a recordable release of the
leased premises until sixty days after it had made formal written demand
of the release." 70
64. 471 So. 2d 938 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
65. 505 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
66. La. R.S. 31:206 (Supp. 1987).
67. La. R.S. 31:207 (Supp. 1987).
68. 509 So. 2d 39 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 41.
70. Id. at 42.
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V. OIL WELL LIEN ACT-LESSOR'S LIEN
Prescription- OCS
Oil Well Lien Act issues continue to be a source of litigation
though recent Louisiana Supreme Court decisions and legislation could
lessen these issues in the future. A split among several circuits of the
courts of appeal on an important provision of the Louisiana Oil Well
Lien Act was resolved by the Louisiana Supreme Court last fall. The
split occured as to the issue of whether failure to file a record notice
of the lien within the 180 day period specified in the Act7 resulted
in loss of the privilege or merely loss of ranking of the privilege.
Stated differently, is the 180 day period a prescriptive period? The
Supreme Court ruled in Louisiana Materials Co. v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. 72 that it was not a 180 day prescriptive period and, thus, a lien
could be asserted by parties who gave notice up to a year after the
furnishing of services or supplies. Nonetheless, the 180 days is now a
prescriptive period by virtue of Act 191 of 1986 of the legislature.71
In St. Mary Iron Works v. McMoran Exploration Co. 74 it was
held that the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act, rather than the Louisiana
Private Works Act, applies to structures on the Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) adjacent to Louisiana. A lien was valid under the Act even
though there was no proper place for filing the lien for recordation.
Coburn sold materials to St. Mary Iron Works and CSI performed
electrical work for St. Mary Iron Works, all as part of the construction
of an offshore crew living quarters which upon completion was moved
to federal lands of the OCS adjacent to Louisiana coastal waters. St.
Mary filed bankruptcy proceedings shortly after completion, and three
days later Coburn and CSI filed liens in Louisiana parish records. In
bankruptcy proceedings, St. Mary took the position that Coburn and
CSI were unsecured creditors since the liens were not filed within the
sixty day filing period specified in the Louisiana Private Works Act.
Coburn and CSI maintained that the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act
applied, and under it they had 180 days in which to file. The bankruptcy
court and the district court ruled that the Private Works Act applied
and that as a result the liens had not been timely filed. On appeal to
the Fifth Circuit, the court of appeals initially affirmed these deci-
71. La. R.S. 9:4862 (Supp. 1987).
72. 493 So. 2d 1141 (La. 1986). The background developments and the holding of
the case are discussed in Martin, Developments in the Law, 1985-86-Mineral Rights,
47 La. L. Rev. 347, 363-65 (1986).
73. 1986 La. Acts No. 191.
74. 809 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1987).
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sions, 7 but then granted a rehearing in light of the decision from the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Louisiana Materials Co. v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co. 76 Following that decision, the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded. Louisiana law applies on the OCS as surrogate federal law.
The Louisiana Act does have application on the OCS. Under the
Louisiana Supreme Court decision, the recording of a lien is not
necessary for the lien to be effective under the Oil Well Lien Act.
The case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this. The court declined to speculate on the effect of the 1986 act
amending the Oil Well Lien Act to require recordation within the
specified time in order to preserve the lien privilege; there will be no
place in which to file when the OCS lands area is involved.
The Fifth Circuit is applying state law, as it must, in the manor
it existed at the time the rights in question arose as interpreted by the
Louisiana courts. One should note, as the Fifth Circuit does in footnote
5,77 the passage of Act 191 of 198678 by the Louisiana legislature. Act
191 amends sections 4862 and 4865 of Title IX of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes. 79 It is now clear that the privilege is extinguished if the
claimant or holder does not preserve it by filing the required notice
within 180 days or if the claimant does not institute an action on the
privilege within a year of recordation of the notice.
It was subsequent to this amendment that the Louisiana Supreme
Court ruled in Louisiana Materials Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.80 that
the 180 day period had not been a prescriptive period prior to, this
amendment and, thus, a lien could be asserted by parties who gave
notice up to a year after the furnishing of services or supplies. This
was the rule that the Fifth Circuit had to apply to the facts of the
instant case. Nonetheless, the 180 days is now a prescriptive period
by virtue of Act 191 of 1986,81 and the courts will have to reach a
different result from the reported case on cases arising after this
amendment as to the issue of the necessity of filing. One should also
note that the court in Louisiana Materials Co. did not rule specifically
on the applicability of the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act to the OCS.
But this may not affect the ruling of the Fifth Circuit because as the
Fifth Circuit suggests, the Louisiana statute can apply regardless of
the intent of the Louisiana legislature; it is the Federal OCS Lands
75. St. Mary Iron Works, Inc. v. Mc.Moran Exploration Co., 802 F.2d 809 (5th
Cir. 1986).
76. 493 So. 2d 1141 (La. 1986).
77. St. Mary Iron Works, 809 F.2d at 1135 n.5.
78. 1986 La. Acts No. 191.
79. La. R.S. 9:4862, 4865 (Supp. 1987).
80. 493 So. 2d 1141.
81. 1986 La. Acts No. 191.
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Act that makes Louisiana law applicable to the OCS, not the Louisiana
statute itself.
Another Louisiana court of appeal decision has also recently taken
up the issue of the applicability of the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act
to the OCS. This was Genina Marine Services, Inc. v. ARCO Oil &
Gas Co.82 This case involved the filing of a lien for furnishing vessels
in connection with drilling and production of offshore wells. The court
held Louisiana's Oil Well Lien Act is applicable to property located
on the OCS off the Louisiana coast. It further held that under the
Oil Well Lien Act, suit must be filed within one year of the last day
on which services were performed, however, the case was remanded
for determination if proceedings against another party in bankruptcy
court interrupted this prescriptive period.
Defendant ARCO contracted with Briley Marine for boat services
in connection with wells off the Louisiana coast on the federal OCS
and Briley Marine in turn contracted for the services with plaintiff
Genina. ARCO paid Briley but Briley failed to pay Genina. Genina
did not file a notice of privilege until thirteen months after the per-
formance of the services. Suit was not filed until twenty-five months
after the services. The trial court granted defendant ARCO's motion
for summary judgment seeking dismissal on the ground that the wells
were on the OCS and that the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act was
therefore inapplicable. Plaintiff appealed, and on appeal the defendant
also raised the exceptions of prescription and no cause of action. The
court reversed and remanded.
Louisiana law applies to leases on the federal OCS unless it is in
conflict or inconsistent with federal law. As discussed earlier, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has ruled in Louisiana Materials Co. that
failure to record a privilege within the time limit expressed in Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:4862 forfeits the priority but not the privilege. 83 But
the supreme court did not decide what prescriptive period does apply.
The court of appeal here adopts the same position regarding prescrip-
tion as Genina Marine Services, Inc. v. Mark Producing Co.84 and I.
E. Miller of Eunice, Inc. v. Source Petroleum, Inc.85 which have held
that in regard to unrecorded liens or liens filed beyond the time period
specified in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4862 (90 days in this case,
180 days after August 30, 1983),86 suit must be filed within one year
of the last day on which services were preformed. The case was
82. 499 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
83. 493 So. 2d 1141. La. R.S. 9:4862 (Supp. 1987).
84. 490 So. 2d 1158 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
85. 484 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
86. La. R.S. 9:4862 (Supp. 1987).
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remanded for further proceedings to determine if prescription as to
ARCO was interrupted by Genina's proceeding against Briley Marine
.in bankruptcy court.
Who is a "Furnisher"?
The case of Texas Pipe and Supply Co. v. Coon Ridge Pipeline
Co., Inc.8 7 presented the issue of who may assert a lien under the
Act. Here Bell Supply Company agreed to provide the defendants'
predecessor with pipe for construction of a pipeline. Bell in turn
contracted with Texas Pipe for the pipe supplies. Bell Supply was
apparently paid for the pipe but did not pay Texas Pipe before filing
for Chapter 11 protection. The defendants, owners of interest in the
pipeline, signed guarantees in order that Texas Pipe would remove a
lien it had filed against the pipeline. They resisted payment, however,
on the ground that Bell was the furnisher of the pipe and had already
been paid, and that Texas Pipe was not entitled to any lien rights
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4861. 81 The trial court and court
of appeal ruled that Texas Pipe was a "furnisher" of materials within
the meaning of the Act even though there was no contractual rela-
tionship with the defendants.8 9 The court apparently placed considerable
reliance on the fact that it was Texas Pipe that actually delivered the
materials to the pipeline work sites and that the pipe which was
delivered was used in the building of the pipeline.
A similar issue as to who is a "furnisher" was involved in P &
A Well Service Inc. v. Blackie's Power Swivels, Inc.90 A renter of
drilling equipment, Blackie's, filed a lien notice against mineral leases
where a drilling contractor, P & A, was performing services. Blackie's
had rented the equipment to Fishing Tool and Fishing Tool in turn
had rented the equipment to P & A. The contractor, P & A, then
filed suit for cancellation of the lien. The court agreed with P & A
that Blackie's was not a "furnisher" within the meaning of the statute
because Blackie's had not furnished P & A with any equipment. The
case of Oil Well Supply Co. v. Independent Oil Co.9' was distinguished
on the ground that while there had been no contractual relationship
in that case, the party seeking to establish the lien had furnished
materials and supplies directly to the oil well contractor.
87. 506 So. 2d 1296 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
88. La. R.S. 9:4861 (Supp. 1987).
89. The court relied on Oil Well Supply Co. v. Indep. Oil Co., 219 La. 936, 54
So. 2d 330 (1951).
90. 507 So. 2d 280 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
91. 219 La. 936, 54 So. 2d 330 (1951).
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Seizure of Movables of Third Party by Lessor
The court of appeal found an absence of express law in the Mineral
Code governing the rights of third parties upon seizure of their mov-
ables by a lessor for nonpayment of rent or other lease obligations in
the case of Vaught v. Ratliff.92 Here Ratliff was doing work on a
lease for the lessee of plaintiffs and had a truck, a mud pump, a set
of tongs, and various tools on the lease site. When the plaintiffs
brought suit against the lessee for unpaid royalties and damages, they
seized Ratliff's movables pursuant to their lessor's privilege provided
in the Mineral Code. 93 Ratliff intervened to seek dissolution of the
writ of sequestration insofar as it affected his property. He asserted
that the Civil Code allowed such a remedy. 94 The trial court denied
his intervention, stating that the Mineral Code covered the subject and
excluded operation of the Civil Code provision. The court of appeal
reversed. While the Mineral Code did not conflict with the Civil Code
article in question, the court of appeal said there was an absence of
any treatment of the rights of third parties in the Mineral Code
provisions and that such treatment should be considered by the leg-
islature rather than covered by judicial emendation. It did find, how-
ever, that the seizure deprived Ratliff of tools and instruments necessary
for the exercise of his trade, calling or profession, and that this was
covered by the general exemptions from seizure and sale. 95
VI. INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION
Mineral Servitudes: Obstacle to Use; Suspension of Prescription
A landowner's efforts to prevent access to and drilling on land
burdened by a mineral servitude was held in Corley v. Craft96 to have
created an obstacle to use of the servitude thereby suspending the
accrual of liberative prescription.
Corley sold a tract of land to Craft reserving the minerals in 1972.
In 1973 Corley granted a lease on the tract, and the lessee in 1974
discovered gas but shut the well in while awaiting a pipeline connection.
In 1984 the current lessee sought to drill a second well to interrupt
prescription within the ten year period required by Louisiana law after
the landowner refused to grant a pipeline right-of-way. The landowner
undertook several actions to prevent access to or drilling on the tract;
92. 509 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
93. La. R.S. 31:146 (1975).
94. La. Civ. Code art. 2707.
95. La. Civ. Code art. 2705. La. R.S. 13:3881 (Supp. 1987).
96. 501 So. 2d 1049 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 503 So. 2d 18 (1987).
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he cut the only access road, blocked the entrance after another access
road was laid, and then confessed to unlawfully dumping waste on
the property in order that the Department of Environmental Quality
would block drilling. The lessor-servitude owner and her lessee brought
suit for declaration that prescription had been suspended, for damages,
and for injunctive relief. A jury returned a verdict for the defendant
landowner, but the trial judge entered judgment NOV for the plaintiffs,
granting plaintiffs 120 days from the date of final judgment in which
to interrupt prescription. Defendants appealed, wherein, the appellate
court amended and affirmed.
Under the Mineral Code, if the owner of a mineral servitude is
prevented from using it by an obstacle that he can neither prevent nor
remove, the prescription of nonuse does not run as long as the obstacle
remains. Here a continuous chain of obstacles within the contemplation
of the Mineral Code was created thereby suspending the accrual of
liberative prescription. But the facts showed that only about ten days
remained before accrual of prescription when the obstacles were estab-
lished. The trial court granted 120 days extension in recognition of
"gear-up" time needed to take actions necessary to interrupt prescrip-
tion, but the court of appeal amended this to forty-five days.
VII. TORT CASES INVOLVING OIL AND GAS
Claim of Improper Completion of Well and Excessively Large Pit
The court ruled in Fuller v. Franks Petroleum, Inc. 97 that the
evidence supported jury findings that defendant lessee did not complete
a well improperly and did not use an excessively large pit; however,
the court of appeal reversed the judgment below that the lessee had
paid royalties and instead rendered a decision awarding royalties plus
interest and attorney's fees.
Plaintiff lessors brought suit against their lessees seeking damages
and lease cancellation based on claims that the lessees failed to operate
as a prudent operator and failed to pay royalties timely. The plaintiffs
asserted that the operator improperly completed the well by allowing
it to be shut in without removing all fract water, thereby allowing the
creation of a permeability barrier, and that the operator used an
excessively large pit, causing them loss of land for hay production.
The jury found on all points for the defendants and the trial judge
entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiffs appealed and as indicated, the
court reversed in part and rendered. The jury's findings were well
supported by the evidence as to the operation of the well. However,
97. 501 So. 2d 1024 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
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the evidence established that the defendant Franks had not stated a
reasonable cause for not paying the condensate royalty within thirty
days after demand as provided by statute after demand and had not
paid the royalty. The presumption of due receipt of a communication
through the mail was rebutted by the defendants' and plaintiffs' tes-
timony. The court of appeal awarded to the plaintiffs the amount of
royalties due plus interest from the date due and a reasonable attorney's
fee to compensate for attorney's services only insofar as they related
to the nonpayment of the relatively small amount of royalties for the
period in question. The court noted this award would be the same
even if it had concluded that the mailing of the checks had constituted
payment.
Improper Well Location: Damages
In Toce Oil Co. v. Central Industries," the court ruled that an
oil company (not the working interest owners) which hired the surveyor
and others for drilling of the well was the proper party to bring suit
for improper location drilling of the well and that a surveyor does
have a duty to locate stakes properly and to remove stakes located
improperly.
In this case, Toce Oil Company drilled a well and discovered it
was drilled at an incorrect location. It brought suit against the surveyor
that staked the well location, the boardroad contractor that prepared
the incorrect site for drilling, and the contractor's insurer. The surveyor
staked two correct locations and an incorrect location. The boardroad
contractor found only the stake at the incorrect location and prepared
its bid for drilling preparations there. After discovering that the well
was drilled at the wrong location, Toce credited its investors for the
well cost and then redrilled at the proper location.
The trial court ruled in favor of Toce for an amount representing
870/% of the damages claimed (55076 from the surveyor and 32% from
the boardroad contractor and its insurer) and found Toce responsible
for 13% of the negligence contributing to the drilling of the mislocated
well on the basis that Toce should have realized that the well was
incorrectly located after being put on notice by a call from a working
interest owner who had observed the well and made inquiry about the
location. The surveyor and the boardroad contractor appealed and the
court of appeal affirmed. The oil company was the proper party to
bring the suit, not the working interest owners, because the company
was the party that entered into the contracts with the defendants. In
addition, the surveyor has a duty to prepare the proper location and
to remove any stakes that are not at a proper location; the client oil
98. 488 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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company does not assume the risk of improper locations staked. The
court did not set aside the percentage of negligence allocated by the
trial court. The boardroad contractor's preparation of the wrong lo-
cation for the drilling site was a cause-in-fact of the oil company's
damages.
Blowouts
Where a neighboring well was injured by a blowout of a well on
adjacent property, the owner of the blowout well was held not to be
liable for damages that were merely speculative and thus not proven
to a legal certainty. This occured in the case of Coon v. Placid Oil
Co.99 where the court also ruled that the drilling company working
pursuant to a day contract, under the supervision of the well owner,
was not liable for any damages arising from the blowout.
Plaintiff Coon was the lessee of other plaintiffs, the Kellys. He
drilled a well that penetrated three potentially productive sands, the
K-2, the K-3 and the S-2. He completed in the S-2 but encountered
sanding difficulties after six months of production. He moved up hole
and completed in the K-3, flaring gas for a short time in May 1981.
Some 900 feet away on adjacent property, defendant Placid began
drilling an offset to Coon's well. Then Placid began, with a rig under
a day work contract from defendant Justiss, a second offset well some
450 feet from the Coon well. This -second Placid offset well blew out.
Coon shut in his well, and there was substantial surface and subsurface
damage from the blowout which was found to be caused by inadequate
mud. Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants Placid and Justiss for
surface and subsurface damages. The trial court dismissed the claims
against Justiss on the basis that Placid was supervising the drilling
and was solely liable. The court awarded damages for loss of future
income in favor of Coon for $724,402 and in favor of the Kellys for
$145,775 for loss of future income, surface damages, mental anguish
and inconvenience. Placid was also charged with expert witness fees.
Plaintiffs and defendant Placid appealed, wherein, the court reversed
and rendered in part and affirmed in part.
The court of appeal ruled that it is necessary for the injured
claimant to prove damages so that they are sufficiently removed from
the purely speculative realm to the sphere of reality. The plaintiffs
failed to meet this burden, said the court, as to the oil sands and
thus failed to prove their claim for loss of future income to a legal
certainty. There was no error as to surface damages. Since supervisory
responsibility was charged to Placid's supervisor at the rig and Justiss's
99. 493 So. 2d 1236 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 497 So. 2d 1002 (1986).
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employees only worked under his direction, Placid was soley liable.
The expert witness fees which related to subterranean damages were
not to be assessed.
As the court states in Coon v. Placid, the jurisprudence has often
denied damages resulting from oil well blowouts because such damage
awards are too speculative. This avoidance of speculation in damages
reduces considerably the impact of the Mineral Code article 10 which
provides: "A person with rights in a common reservoir or deposit of
mineral may not make works, operate, or otherwise use his rights so
as to deprive another intentionally or negligently of the liberty of
enjoying his rights, or that may intentionally or negligently cause
damage to him."' 00 The comments to this article make it clear that
the Mineral Code contemplates damages for reservoir damage resulting
from well blowouts by its references to cases from other jurisdictions
imposing liability in such circumstances. One might note the anomaly
of the geological and other data pertaining to the plaintiff's well being
of sufficient quality to induce the defendant to drill two offset wells,
yet inadequate to sustain a judgment for plaintiff.
Implied Right of Lessee to Use Leased Premises for Disposal by
Injection of Salt Water from Other Wells on Same Lease
The court of appeal for the third circuit, in Leger v. Petroleum
Engineers, Inc.,'01 ruled that an oil and gas lessee had the implied
right to use the leased premises for injection of salt water produced
in conjunction with production of oil and gas on the same leasehold.
The injection well was reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purposes of the lease.
Lessors brought suit against lessee for damages from disposal of
salt water by the lessee through a well converted from a dry hole into
an injection well on the property. The salt water injected came from
two other producing wells on the same lease. The plaintiffs claimed
that the injections were not authorized by the lease and were in fact
prohibited by a clause providing for payment for damages to timber
and growing crops. The trial court held for defendant, the plaintiffs
appealed, and the court of appeal affirmed. The lessee under an oil
and gas lease may make such use of the surface of the leased property
and construct such works thereon as are reasonably necessary for the
full exploration of the property and enjoyment of the leasehold interest.
The injection well here was reasonably necessary for the accomplish-
ment of the purpose of the lease: the production of oil and gas. The
100. La. R.S. 31:10 (1975).
101. 499 So. 2d 953 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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surface damage clause deals only with payment of damages and res-
toration of the surface and has no application to the injection well.
Surface Damages
In Edwards v. Jeems Bayou Production Co.,10 2 the plaintiff land-
owner brought suit against his mineral lessee for damages to the leased
premises. A well drilled by the lessee had been shut-in for about two
and one-half years at the time of suit. About four acres were taken
up by the well site, pits had not been properly filled and the area
around the well was in such rough condition it could not be worked
by a bush hog or tractor. About two acres would be needed for
operations when a purchaser for the gas became available. These con-
ditions and a road left the twelve acre hay meadow too small for
cultivation. The trial court awarded a total of $4,375 to the plaintiff
for loss of hay ($1200), repair of fence ($35), loss of an oak tree
($140) and damage to the land ($3,000).
Damages were available to the landowner where the lessee's use
of the land was unreasonable and where the lessee had failed to restore
the land as nearly as was practical to its original condition. 0 3 Negli-
gence, noted the court, is not necessary for the landowner to recover
for damages. However, the court ruled that the lessee had the right
to use so much of the land as was reasonably necessary for the drilling
and operation of the well. No growing hay crop was destroyed and
the landowner was not entitled to recover damages for the entire twelve
acres as to future crops of hay. The award to the plaintiff was reduced
to reflect this, when the court of appeal found that $2,000 would be
adequate to cover the cost of restoring the part of the drill site not
needed in the lessee's ongoing operations.
Trespass
Through a surveyor's error, a well was drilled on the property line
dividing on one side a tract of land leased by defendant operator and
on the other side land owned by the plaintiff. The operator did not
participate in or supervise the surveying of the well and did not visit
the site until after the well was drilled. The plaintiff landowners in
Reitzell v. Spooner " brought suit for trespass against the defendant
102. 507 So. 2d 11 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
103. The court relied on article 11 of the Mineral Code, La. R.S. 31:11 (Supp.
1987), which provides that the owner of land burdened by a mineral right and the owner
of a mineral right must exercise their respective rights with reasonable regard for the
rights of the other, and article 122 of the Mineral Code, La. R.S. 31:122 (1975), which
provides that the mineral lessee will operate as a reasonably prudent operator.
104. 505 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
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for the well drilled on their property. The operator was held liable as
he was the person who engaged the services of the surveyor and who
instructed the drilling company to drill the well at the location staked
by the surveyor. Thus, the defendant caused the trespass and had to
respond in damages. The amount of the award was reduced because
of incorrect calculation by the trial court.
VIII. CONSERVATION CASES: POOLING AND UNITIZATION
Unit Operator-Notice to Non-Operators
By statute, the operator of a unit is required to report to other
owners on a monthly basis the amount of oil or gas produced and
the manner of disposal.'0 5 The statute further provides for cost item-
ization for wells within ninety days of well completion to owners of
unleased interests.10 6 It also provides for a penalty resulting from failure
to report and for forfeiture of the right to demand contribution from
the owners of the unleased owners.'° 7 In Rivers v. Sun Oil Co., mineral
interest owners brought suit for costs of production as a result of the
operator's failure to comply with the statute.'0 8 The operator recon-
vened for alleged overpayment of royalties. The trial court found, and
the appellate court affirmed, that the operator had not complied with
the reporting requirements of section 103.1 of title 30 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes for drilling and for reworking operations. The demands
by the plaintiffs were sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements of
the statute. The plaintiffs had urged also that the trial court award
penalties to them under section 104 of title 30. However, this section
of the statute is criminal in nature and does not contemplate the
possibility of fines being paid to mineral interest owners. The courts
denied recovery to the defendant on its reconventional demand for
overpayment of royalties.
105. La. R.S. 30:103 (1975).
106. La. R.S. 30:103.1 (1975).
107. La. R.S. 30:103.2 (1975). La. R.S. 30:104 (1975) provides for a criminal penalty
for failure to comply with these requirements.
108. 503 So. 2d 1036 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
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